Consumers were surprised in October 2009, the first of a series of high-profile recalls of Toyota vehicles in the United States. Referring to the potential problems, which posted bad or wrong mats under the driver seat can cause uncontrolled acceleration in the range of models, Toyota announced that it has recalled 3.8 million U.S. cars. For manufacturing executives who for decades have sought to emulate Toyota, an assumption that it was a question of quality was a serious question. Around the world, leaders paused to wonder if they were chasing the wrong model of production. Despite the long history of Toyota to build a reliable, low-defect vehicles, public opinion about the quality is often greatly influenced by reports in the media and their general terms, the author claims. A key issue has been the source of problems Toyota: To what extent they are the product of design and assembly, and to what extent they can be tied to the power company and production systems? The author considers the two main causes of the problem Toyota quality. The first is the result of leadership ambitions for rapid growth. The aim of management is to increase the global market share of Toyota 7.3% in 1995 to 10% in the next decade, and then to 15% by 2010. The second is the result of more complex products. A typical car sold in the United States or Europe has more than 60 electronic control units and more than 10 million lines of code, or four times more than what was common a decade ago. However, the author notes that any thorough analysis should also recognize the role of the centralized management structure of the company. Result: Top management in Japan was less sensitive to the expectations of regulators, culture and politics in foreign markets, and, therefore, they have been slower to respond to local problems "Hide
. by Robert E. Cole Source: MIT Sloan Management Review 7 pages. Publication Date: July 1, 2011. Prod. #: SMR395-PDF-ENG