On Tuesday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina battered New Orleans, causing insufficient levees to collapse and flood the city in what came to be broadly regarded as a man-made disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) calculated that 105,000 of the city's 188,000 housing units were severely damaged or ruined. It was the worst urban disaster in national recollection. Nevertheless, city leaders were not ready to accept New Orleans' demise. Its volunteer members were leaders in the business and non-profit worlds. ULI's panel of experts urged what it saw as a down-to-earth strategy. The city lacked the resources to re-establish services immediately to all of New Orleans. It would need to pick and select the areas that are most promising to reconstruct first. The expectation was that vibrant revival in the middle would catalyze development elsewhere. Meanwhile, reconstruction of the lower-lying, poorer sections of town hardest hit by Katrina would have to wait.
In fact, it may not make sense to rebuild areas likely to experience serious flooding in a future hurricane. Two-thirds of the city's pre-Katrina residents were African Americans, disproportionately residents of the poorer, lower-lying, worst damaged areas. Some saw the ULI strategy as a conspiracy to remove them and make New Orleans whiter. Even many middle class whites and blacks who didn't share the conspiracy theory opposed the ULI proposition because it appeared to relegate their homes and neighborhoods to oblivion. City councilors representing lower-lying districts feared that their political base would be planned by ULI out of existence.
Plans versus Politics New Orleans after Katrina case study solution
PUBLICATION DATE: February 04, 2011 PRODUCT #: HKS100-HCB-ENG
This is just an excerpt. This case is about STRATEGY & EXECUTION