Magna International, Inc, a Canadian car parts manufacturer, is considering whether and how to relax the dual class ownership structure. Family trust controlled by the founder owns 0.65% economic interest in the company, but has 66% of the vote by the super-voting class of shares. Employees are considered as fashion a deal that will end the control of the family and get the approval of both classes of shares. Magna (A) case asks the students to weigh the costs and benefits of dual-class ownership and the best way to convert to a single class. Magna (B) describes the case of the proposal that the board Magna, put to a vote of shareholders. Students were asked to evaluate it and decide whether they will approve it. "Hide
by Timothy A. Luehrman, Yuhai Xuan Source: Harvard Business School 2 pages. Publication Date: November 5, 2010. Prod. #: 211045-PDF-ENG
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