This epilogue accompanies case 2029.0. Zero day vulnerabilities are crucial components of computer viruses, worms, and other forms of malware. Vendors and security companies seek these flaws in order to patch and fix insecure software and hardware. Increasingly, nevertheless, country states and offenders purchase zero-days from independent security researchers to be able to come up with new destructive cyberweapons and capabilities. Handling the growing trade in zero day vulnerabilities is a vital challenge for corporate leaders as well as policymakers. Beresford is followed by the case as he finds a set of new zero-days and considers the different disclosure alternatives available to someone in his position.
The case reviews the mix of incentives that may encourage or deter the discoverer of a new zero day to: (1) disclose the defect to the vendor of the risky software or hardware privately; (2) reveal the defect to the general public, without notifying the vendor; (3) pursue a hybrid-strategy called responsible or coordinated disclosure; (4) or opt to sell the vulnerability. The case illuminates the various costs and advantages of each of these approaches for the security researcher, the seller of the defective software or hardware, and the public at large. Ultimately, the case asks students to contemplate which model of disclosure is most advantageous for the public and to contemplate what policy levers are useful in supporting that model. Instance number 2029.1
The Vulnerability Economy Zero-Days, Cybersecurity, and Public Policy Epilogue Case Study Solution
PUBLICATION DATE: February 04, 2015 PRODUCT #: KS1014-HCB-ENG
This is just an excerpt. This case is about TECHNOLOGY & OPERATIONS